The Classification of Hezbollah in Both International and Non-International Armed Conflicts by Bloom, Catherine
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law
Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 5
2008
The Classification of Hezbollah in Both
International and Non-International Armed
Conflicts
Catherine Bloom
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bloom, Catherine (2008) "The Classification of Hezbollah in Both International and Non-International Armed Conflicts," Annual
Survey of International & Comparative Law: Vol. 14: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol14/iss1/5
THE CLASSIFICATION OF 






The 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel questions an important, 
yet unclear part of international humanitarian law. Specifically, what 
would Hezbollah' s legal classification be if another armed conflict were 
to arise between Israel and Lebanon? Would Hezbollah be considered a 
State or non-State actor? If Hezbollah is a non-State actor, would the 
group be considered "guerrillas"? Would the term "mercenary" be a 
better fit? 
In attempting to answer some of these questions, we must first look at 
what exactly occurred between Israel and Lebanon in the summer of 
2006. Second, we must understand who Hezbollah is and how the group 
fits in with Lebanon. Third, we need to examine what kinds of rules of 
international humanitarian law govern both international and 
intra-national armed conflicts. Specifically, the Hague Conventions, the 
Geneva Conventions, international agreements between Lebanon and 
* This article focuses only on the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 
2006 and attempts to discuss the implications of intemationallaw with respect to that specific armed 
conflict only. Recent events taking place in Lebanon would lend themselves to a different analysis 
and, likely, a different outcome 
** J.D., 2008, Golden Gate University; B.S., DePaul University, 2001. 
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Israel, and international customary law. Only then will we be ready to 
investigate the various implications Hezbollah's classification has on the 
laws of armed conflict. This will primarily be accomplished by initially 
looking at which of the Geneva Conventions apply based on whether 
Hezbollah is a State or non-State actor. A more complex argument is 
whether Hezbollah is indeed a Lebanese State actor. However, since the 
law in this sphere is still being defined, we will continue by examining 
Hezbollah's classification assuming they are non-State actor. Therefore, 
an analysis of Hezbollah as a guerrilla group and one comprised of 
mercenaries will follow. Finally, we will look to see how domestic law 
fits in with international humanitarian law, and whether the former can 
help adjudicate either party in a future conflict. 
The answer to these questions is of great significance because 
Hezbollah's classification determines how international humanitarian 
law applies. For example, if Hezbollah is a State actor, then any future 
conflicts would be between Lebanon and Israel. As such, this would be 
an international armed conflict. On the other hand, if Hezbollah is a 
non-State actor, then this would be an intra-national armed conflict 
governed by a substantially limited body of law. Furthermore, if 
Hezbollah is given prisoner of war status, then members of the group 
would have to be released at the end of the hostilities. If Hezbollah 
members are not considered prisoners of war, then the individuals may 
be held and prosecuted under domestic criminal law for their conduct. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. RECENT ISRAEL - LEBANON CONFLICT 
On July 12, 2006, members of Hezbollah attacked an Israeli army 
convoy, killing eight Israeli soldiers and capturing two more. l Hezbollah 
claimed that the soldiers were captured for the purpose of being used as 
"bargaining chips" in negotiations for the release of three Lebanese 
Hezbollah members detained by Israel (even though the country's own 
Supreme Court ordered for their release).2 As a result of the soldiers' 
kidnapping, Israel attacked Lebanon with a force unseen since 1982.3 In 
response to Israel's "bombing campaign," Hezbollah launched hundreds 
1. Lara Deeb, Hizballah: A Primer, Middle East Reporter Online, July 31, 2006, 
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.htrnl; see also Anthony Dworkin, The Middle East Crisis 
and International Law, Crimes of War Project, July 18, 2006, 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-middleeast.html. 
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of rockets into Israe1.4 Israel and Hezbollah engaged in a heavy armed 
conflict until August 14, 2006.5 In addition to executing 5,000 air strikes 
over Lebanon, Israel's "Operation Change of Direction" involved 
attacking various parts of Lebanon from land and sea.6 Hezbollah ftred 
over 2,500 rockets into Israel over the course of the conflict.7 According 
to the Reuters Foundation, as of August 25, 2006, close to 1,200 
Lebanese and 157 Israelis were killed in the conflict.s Hundreds of 
thousands of Israeli civilians and roughly one million Lebanese civilians 
were displaced as a result of the conflict and the destruction of a large 
part of southern Lebanon.9 
The armed attack on the convoy on Israeli soil and Israel's retaliatory 
bombing campaign on Lebanon is considered an armed conflict. There is 
much debate with respect to this conflict, including the question of 
whether it should be classifted as an international or non-international 
armed conflict. to In either scenario, this conflict is governed by 
international humanitarian law. 
4. Id. 
5. Amnesty Int'!, IsraeVLebanon: Under fire: Hizbullah's attacks on northern Israel, 
September 14, 2006, http://web.amnesty.orgllibrarylIndexlENGMDE020252006. 
6. Id.; see also Statement submitted by Human Rights Watch to the Second Special session of 
the Human Rights Council, The terrible toll of the Israel-Lebanon conflict on civilians: ongoing 
human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, August 10, 2006, 
http://hrw.org/englishldocsl2006/0S/10Ilebano13955_txt.htm. 
7. Statement submitted by Human Rights Watch to the Second Special session of the Human 
Rights Council, The terrible toll of the Israel-Lebanon conflict on civilians: ongoing human rights 
abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, August 10, 2006, 
http://hrw.org/englishldocsl2006/0S/10Ilebano13955_txt.htm. 
S. Reuters Foundation, Who Works Where: Lebanon latest, August 24, 2006, 
http://www.alertnet.org/thefactslreliefresourcesI11534S060912.htm; see also Sara Leah Whitson, 
He;:bollah Needs to Answer, A1-Sharq al-Awsat, October 5, 2006, 
http://hrw.org/englishldocsl2006/10/05Ilebano14336.htm (Additionally, according to Lebanon's 
reconstruction chief, the conflict caused $3.6 billion worth of physical damage in Lebanon. Most 
Lebanese displaced by the war have returned, but a third remains homeless because their houses are 
destroyed or littered with unexploded bombs. A survey by UNICEF showed that 10 out of 12 
villages visited in southern Lebanon had no water supply. The World Health Organization reported 
severe damage to SOO health centers). 
9. Sara Leah Whitson, Hezbollah Needs to Answer, A1-Sharq al-Awsat, October 5, 2006, 
http://hrw.org/englishldocsl2006/10/05IlebanoI4336.htm; see Amnesty Int'I, Israel/Lebanon: Under 
fire: Hizbullah's attacks on northern Israel, September 14,2006, 
http://web.amnesty.orgllibrarylIndexlENGMDE020252006. 
10. Much of the other debate focus and discussion was about the fact that Hezbollah launched 
thousands of "Katyusha" rockets into densely-populated regions in Northern Israel. These types of 
rockets are particularly dangerous to civilians because they are neither technologically advanced nor 
can they aim for military targets with sufficient precision. Hezbollah justified the attacks on Israeli 
civilians by either claiming that the rockets were indeed aimed at military targets or that such acts 
were legitimate under Islamic law. On the other hand, Israel was accused of an egregiously 
disproportional reaction to the kidnapping of their soldiers in violation of international humanitarian 
law. Both sides also resorted to the use of cluster bombs, which are particularly condemned in the 
community due to their highly destructive nature. 
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B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF HEZBOLLAH 
The Lebanese Shia, driven by a desire to gather forces to fight the Israeli 
occupation of southern Lebanon, founded Hezbollah (the Party of God) 
in 1982.11 This movement gained momentum quickly due to logistical, 
financial, and military support from both Syria and Iran. 12 Currently, 
Hezbollah is an inspiration to other Islamic groups (including Hamas in 
Palestine and Muqtada al-Sad's Madhi Army in Iraq) because of its 
success in driving Israel out of Lebanon. 13 The group consists of several 
thousand core members who function independently with some military 
aid provided by Iran!4 Hezbollah's spiritual leader is Sheikh 
Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. 15 Another important member of the 
organization is Imad Fayez Mugniyah, who, prior to his death on 
February 13, 2008, was considered the main event planner of the 
organization's military operations!6 The senior political leader, Hassan 
Nasrallah, is arguably the most charismatic man in the modem Islamic 
world. 17 Nasrallah was originally a military commander, but he quickly 
took advantage of the intra-organizational rivalries (and his favorable 
status with the head of Iran's government, Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi 
Khomeini) to become Hezbollah's Secretary General in 1992, and 
remains there to this day. IS 
According to a number of United States' intelligence reports indicate 
that, in addition to Hezbollah's presence in Lebanon, Hezbollah operates 
cells in Europe, Africa and both South and North America. 19 Over the 
last twenty years, Hezbollah has developed a sophisticated structure.20 
The organization consists of a seven-member council called the majlis 
al-shura:21 Each member is in charge of a different function, including 
II. James Brandon, Factfile: Hezhollah, Aljazeera, July 14,2006, 
http://english.a1jazeera.netlEnglish! archiveiarchive?ArchiveId=24454; see also 





15. Council on Foreign Relations, Hezhollah, July 17,2006, 
http://www.cfr.orglpublicationl9155. 
16. /d.; Imad Mugniyah was killed in a car bombing in Damascus. Hezbollah official accused 
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financial, judicial, social, political and military mattersY When 
Hezbollah first entered Lebanese politics, the organization created an 
executive council and a politburo.23 
Hezbollah's decision to participate in the 1992 Lebanese elections 
signaled a shift in the organization's focus from a "pan-Islamic resistance 
to Israel" to the internal affairs of Lebanon.24 This shift demonstrated 
Hezbollah's growing desire to infiltrate Lebanon's political system.25 
Hezbollah has continued this transformation from a regional militia 
group to a formidable political party. 26 
Hezbollah's entry into mainstream Lebanese politics was aided by the 
assassination of ex-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.27 Although a 
determination as to which group caused Hariri's death has never been 
made, Syria "came to figure prominently in virtually all theories about 
Hariri's assassination."28 Hariri's assassination lead to a growing anti-
Syrian sentiment among the Lebanese. As a result, Syria withdrew all of 
its troops from Lebanon.29 The withdrawal of Syrian troops 
drastically changed the balance of power in Lebanon.3o Specifically, this 
shift in power allowed Hezbollah to become the most powerful military 
force in Lebanon, and allowed it to develop a presence in the Lebanese 
cabinet.3l Consequently, Hezbollah defined itself as a "force of 
resistance" not only for Lebanon, but for the entire region as a whole.32 






27. Who are Helbollah?, BBC News, July 13,2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhi1middle_eastl4314423.stm. 
28. Rayyan AI-Shawaf, The Assassination of Rafik Hariri: Lebanon's Shakespearean Tragedy, 
The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 7, 2006, 
http://www.csmonitor.coml2006/11 07/p 16s0 I-bogn.html 
29. Id. 
30. Id. (Hezbollah and Syria, at one point, were so intrinsically linked that many viewed 
Hezbollah as Syria's "Lebanese card" in their effort to regain the Golan Heights from Israel. 
However, after ex-Prime Minister Harriri's assassination and the resulting withdrawal of Syrian 
troops, Hezbollah has taken on position that they were opposed to Syria's withdrawal, however, they 
described Syria's decision as one of "gratitude" to Lebanon and that in return Lebanon should not 
sever their ties with Syria. Although Syria may still provide some support to Hezbollah, the 
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Lebanese Parliament.33 Hezbollah also currently has two ministers in the 
government. 34 
In addition to Hezbollah's vital presence in the Lebanese government, it 
has gathered ample popular support by providing social services and 
health care to many Lebanese in the southern region. Furthermore, 
Hezbollah represents the largest Lebanese community, which is the 
Shiia. Under the leadership of Nasrallah, Hezbollah has helped the Shiia 
community go from one of obscure and marginalized people to an 
organized social and political party. 35 Hezbollah also owns the 
prominent television station, al-Manar.36 
Furthermore, Hezbollah has developed a reputation, even with those who 
oppose its ideals, as being an extremely capable political party on both 
the national and localieveP7 Hezbollah's effectiveness has been evident 
throughout Lebanon's history. For example, on May 24, 2000 the last 
Israeli soldier withdrew from Lebanon.38 Many people predicted that 
after Israeli forces depart, those regions most heavily influenced by the 
departure would erupt in violence.39 However, these predictions were 
never realized because Hezbollah maintained strict order in the border 
regions.40 
Hezbollah's dedication to Lebanon is evident in the organization's 
actions for the benefit of the country and its people. The first item on the 
organization's 2005 electoral platform stated that the organization is 
dedicated to: 
33. Council on Foreign Relations, Hewollah, July 17, 2006, 
http://www.cfr.org/publicationl9155. 
34. [d. 
35. Interview by Kenneth Pollack with Nahum Bamea, Saban Center Kreiz Visiting Fellow 
and Senior Political Analyst of Yediot Aharonot, Hisham Milhem, Washington Correspondent for 
An-Nahar, Shibley Telhami, Saban Center Nonresident Senior Fellow and Anwar Sadat Professor at 
the University of Maryland, Martin Indyk, Director of the Saban Center, at the Saban Center for 
Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution (July 17, 2006), 
www.brookings.edulconun/eventsl20060717.pdf (In this expert discussion of the Israel-Lebanon 
conflict, Mr. Bamea gave the Israeli perspective, Mr. Milhem, provided the. Lebanese perspective, 
Ms. Telhami, commented on the view from the Arab world, and Mr.Indyk, presented policy options 
for the United States) [hereinafter Saban Center Interview]. 
36. Who are Hewollah?, BBC News, July 13,2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2JhiJrniddle_eastl4314423.stm. 
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"safeguard Lebanon's independence and protect it from 
the Israeli menace by safeguarding the Resistance, 
Hezbollah's military wing and its weapons, in order to 
achieve total liberation of Lebanese occupied land. "41 
67 
It is important to note that this position directly contradicts the 2004 
United Nations Council Resolution 1559, which clearly called for the 
disarmament of all Lebanese militia and withdrawal of foreign (mainly 
Syrian) forces from Lebanon.42 With "strong Lebanese political 
support," Hezbollah has used the Shebaa Farms on the Israel-Lebanon 
border as a reason for refusing to demilitarize.43 Hezbollah contends that 
the Shebaa farms are occupied Lebanese territory; however, Israel asserts 
that the farms are on the Syrian side of the border and therefore are part 
of the occupied Golan Heights.44 
Israel's military campaign in the summer of 2006 has led to 
unprecedented support for Hezbollah among the Lebanese because the 
people are putting their "ideological disagreements" with Hezbollah 
aside and are instead supporting the party's anti-Israeli platform.45 In 
October of 2006, 800,000 pro-Hezbollah demonstrators marched in 
Beirut, a city of roughly one million people.46 Such support shows that 
Hezbollah is not only an alarming military power, but also has become a 
political force to be reckoned with.47 In fact, Lebanon has called for 
41. [d. 
42. [d.; see also Who are Hezbollah?, BBC News, July 13,2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhilmiddle_eastl43l4423.stm. 
43. Who are Hezbollah?, BBC News, July 13,2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhi/middle_eastl43l4423.stm (After Israel's withdrawal of forces from 
Lebanon, Hezbollah faces one of their greatest challenges. If Israel is gone, how would Hezbollah 
justify maintaining their military in Southern Lebanon? Many believe that this is why the Sheeba 
Farms have become Hezbollah's "excuse" for not demilitarizing). 
44. Who are Hezbollah?, BBC News, July 13,2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.ukI2lhi/middle_eastl4314423.stm; The United Nations has repeatedly requested 
that both Syria and Lebanon take steps to determine the exact boundary between them in the Sebaa 
Farms region, for more information, see 
http://www.spot-on.comlallbrittonlUN-Report-on-lmplementation-of-170 I-Oct-31.pdf. 
45. Lara Deeb, Hizballah: A Primer, Middle East Reporter Online, July 31, 2006, 
http://www.merip.orglmero/mero073106.html. 
46. Sara Leah Whitson, Hezbollah Needs to Answer, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 5, 2006, 
http://hrw.orglenglishldocsl2006/1O/05IlebanoI4336.htm (The exact population of Beirut is difficult 
to obtain, but various estimates range from roughly 900,000 to 1.1 million people. According to the 
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Israel to be accountable for its violations throughout this conflict, but has 
failed to hold Hezbollah up to the same standard.48 
III. RULES OF LA W 
Fundamentally, international humanitarian law (also known as "the law 
of armed conflict" or "the law of war") is a set of rules that govern how 
parties and individuals should conduct themselves in times of armed 
conflict.49 The purpose of these rules is to limit the effects of armed 
conflicts, to govern the methods and kind of warfare utilized, and to 
protect individuals that are no longer participating in the armed conflict.50 
International humanitarian law falls under the larger umbrella of 
international law, and is contained in treaties or conventions between 
States and various customary laws.51 However, international 
humanitarian law must be distinguished from international human rights 
law. Although the two bodies of law compliment one another, the 
former applies in situations of armed conflict, whereas the latter is 
tailored to protect individuals in times of peace.52 
A. GENERAL RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: HAGUE 
CONVENTIONS, GENEVA CONVENTIONS, ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 
One of the first treaties creating rules of conduct in armed conflict was 
the first Geneva Convention of 1864, which pertained only to the care of 
wounded soldiers.53 The next significant treaties were the Hague 
Conventions. In 1899, the first peace conference at the Hague produced 
four conventions dealing with the settlement of international disputes, the 
laws and customs of war on land, and the regulation of some means of 
warfare.54 In 1907, the second Hague peace conference revised the 
48. Id. (The United Nations Human Rights Council, mainly at the request of Arab member 
nation, quickly established a "commission of inquiry" to look into Israel's violations of the laws of 
international armed conflict. However, the Human Rights Council refused to look at whether 
Hezbollah was guilty of any violations. Therefore, as of October 2006, no international body has 
investigated Hezbollah's actions in the recent conflict.) 




52. In!'1 Comm. of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law: Answers to your 
Questions, February, 2004, 
http://www.icrc.orglWeblEngisiteengO.nsflhtmlalllp0703/$FileIlCRC_002_0703.PDF!Open. 
53. In!'1 Comm. of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions: the core of international 
humanitarian law, January 9, 2006, 
http://www.icrc.orglweb/engisiteengO.nsflhtmlfgenevaconventions. 
54. Hague Convention N, Declaration 1- Concerning the Prohibition, for the Term of Five 
Years, of the Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons or Other New Methods of a 
Similar Nature, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839; see also The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, The 
8
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original conventions, and created numerous other provisions with respect 
to the rights and duties of States and military personnel in times of war, 
the types of weapons that could be utilized, and various additions to the 
rules governing the naval forces in times of war.55 In 1949, the Geneva 
Conventions were expanded into a cohesive body of law compromised of 
the following four Geneva Conventions: 
• Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 
• Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea 
• Convention (ill) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War 
• Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War. 56 
While the Hague Conventions established the rules governing 
belligerents in armed conflicts and limited the effects of war on the 
Laws of War, http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalonllawofwarllawwar.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2oo7) 
(The specific conventions consisted of: Hague I -- Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 
Hague II -- Laws and Customs of War on Land, Hague III -- Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of 
Principles of Geneva Convention of 1864. Hague N -- Prohibiting Launching of Projectiles and 
Explosives from Balloons). 
55. Hague Convention (N) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 3 Stat. 2277; see also The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, The Laws of 
War, http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalonllawofwarllawwar.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2oo7) (The 
specific conventions consisted of: Hague I - Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Hague II -
Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts, Hague III - Opening of 
Hostilities, Hague N - Laws and Customs of War on Land, Hague V - Rights and Duties of Neutral 
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Hague VI - Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the 
Outbreak of Hostilities, Hague VII - Conversion of Merchant Ships into War Ships, Hague VIII -
Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Hague IX - Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time 
of War, Hague X - Adaptation to Maritime War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, Hague 
XI - Restrictions With Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War, Hague XIII -
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War). 
56. Int'I Cornrn. of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions: the core of international 
humanitarian law, January 9, 2oo6, 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsflhtmllgenevaconventions (A number of armed conflicts 
have had an, essentially, immediate impact on the development of international humanitarian law. 
For example, World War I gave rise to a number of treaties in response to the use of certain 
weapons, such as poison gas, aerial bombardments and the capture of prisoners of war, in an 
unprecedented manner. World War II saw a tremendous rise in the death of civilians which gave rise 
to the Fourth Geneva Convention). 
9
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enemy, the Geneva Conventions went even further.57 The Geneva 
Conventions focused not only on the safety of military personnel, but on 
the safety of civilians as well.58 In 1977, the ratification of Additional 
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 essentially 
combined the fundamental laws and principles of the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions. 59 
Additional Protocol I established the rules on the conduct of hostilities.60 
One of the most fundamental rules created by Additional Protocol I was 
the importance of distinguishing between civilians and combatants, and 
between civilian objects and military objectives.61 Additional Protocol II 
was the first international treaty devoted exclusively to protecting 
civilians involved in non-international armed conflicts.62 
In June of 2002, the President of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (hereafter, "ICRC"), Jakob Kellenberger, spoke about the 
Additional Protocols. He stated that as controversial as the Protocols 
were, they reflected the "new reality" of guerilla warfare (the central 
method used by national liberation movements in their struggle for 
independence). Additionally, Kellenberger stated that the Protocols gave 
rise to the idea that non-international armed conflicts are a "matter of 
international concern." 63 
In 2006, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 became the first 
international treaties to achieve universal acceptance by the 194 States in 
the world.64 Thus far, 164 States, including Lebanon (but not Israel), 
have signed Additional Protocol I and 160 States, again including 
Lebanon (but not Israel), have signed Additional Protocol 11.65 There are 
numerous other international treaties that are significant in international 
57. Int'l Cornm. of the Red Cross, lntematioTUlI Humanitarian Law: Answers to your 




60. Int'l Cornm. of the Red Cross, The 25 years of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, July 6, 2002, http://www.icrc.orglweb/englsiteengO.nsflhtrnl/5D6KU6. 
61. ld. 
62. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol m, December 12, 1977, 1125 
V.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol m. 
63. ld. 
64. Int'l Cornrn. of the Red Cross, A milestone for intematioTUlI humanitarian law, September 
22, 2006, http://www.icrc.orglweb/englsiteengO.nsflhtrnl/geneva-conventions-Staternent-220906. 
65. Int'l Cornrn. of the Red Cross, The relevance of lHL in the context of terrorism, May 21, 
2005, http://www.icrc.orgfWeblEnglsiteengO.nsflhtrnllterrorism-ihl-210705. 
10
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law, however, in relations to this conflict, the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols I and II are the most relevant.66 
B. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
Both Israel and Lebanon are bound by those international agreements to 
which they are signatories. For example, both States are parties to the 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and as such, would not be 
allowed to have children under the age of 15 serve in any armed 
conflict.67 The complication in any armed conflict between Hezbollah 
and Israel is that Hezbollah is not a State and cannot be a signatory to an 
international treaty. However, if Hezbollah is acting on behalf of 
Lebanon, it would be bound by any treaty in which Lebanon is a 
signatory. For example, Additional Protocols I and II bind Lebanon 
because the State has signed both treaties. On the contrary, Israel has not 
signed Additional Protocols I and II. Therefore, Israel is bound only to 
those parts of the Protocols that have attained customary law status. 
States and individuals are bound to customary international law 
regardless of whether the specific State is a party to a particular treaty.68 
Therefore, Israel, Lebanon, and Hezbollah are bound to abide by certain 
rules of international humanitarian law because they are so universally 
accepted that they rise to the level of customary law. 
66. Some other important international treaties include: the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg 
(prohibiting the use of certain projectiles in wartime), the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition 
of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of 
warfare, the 1954 Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed 
conflict, 1972 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of 
bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and on their destruction, the 1980 Convention on 
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be 
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (CCW), which includes: the Protocol (D on 
non-detectable fragments, the Protocol (m on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby 
traps and other devices, the Protocol (llI) on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary 
weapons, the 1993 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and 
use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, 1995 Protocol relating to blinding laser weapons, 
the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1999 Protocol to the 1954 Convention on 
cultural property, 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the rights of the child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict. 
67. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 38, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. N44/49 
(Nov. 20, 1989), available at http://www.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu31b1k2crc.htrn 
68. Int'I Comm. of the Red Cross, The relevance of IHL ill the context of terrorism, 
May 21, 2005, http://www.icrc.orglWeblEnglsiteengO.nsflhtmlalllterrorism-ihl-21 0705. 
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C. INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW: GENERAL OVERVIEW AND 
SPECIFIC ILLUSTRATION OF How PROTOCOL I AND IT APPLY TO A NON-
SIGNATORY PARTY SUCH As ISRAEL 
Customary law comes about when a certain practice is so generally 
accepted in the international community, that it essentially becomes 
law.69 The fact that parties in armed conflicts must distinguish between 
combatants and civilians; the fact that civilians cannot be the object of 
attacks; and the notion that parties must do everything in their power to 
avoid disproportionately harming civilians are all examples of customary 
law (even if they have been codified in the Geneva Conventions).7o A 
particular State's acceptance of a practice can be seen by looking at 
official accounts of military operations, military manuals, national 
legislation and case law.71 The obligation for this practice to be 
"accepted as law" is called opinio juris. 
Customary law plays a particularly important role in non-international 
armed conflicts. Even though the majority of modem conflicts are non-
international in nature, there is still a plethora of specific rules that 
govern international armed conflicts, as compared to the sparse nature of 
rules governing non-international armed conflicts (as those are generally 
laid out in Common Article Three and Additional Protocol ll).72 
According to a study published by the ICRC in 2005, a number of crucial 
customary laws define appropriate conduct in non-international armed 
conflicts to a much greater extent than what can be derived from treaty 
law.73 
D. ApPLICATION OF THE RULES OF LAW TO INTERNATIONAL VS. NON-
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 
In international armed conflicts, essentially all of the Geneva 
Conventions, Additional Protocol I, and any other international treaties 
69. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary international humanitarian law: questions and 
answers, August 15,2005, hUp:/Iwww.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsflhtmlJ6BPK3X. 
70. Human Rights Watch, Questions and Answers on Hostilities Between Israel and 
Hezbollah, July 31, 2006, hUp:/lhrw.org/english/docsl2006/07/17flebanoI3748.hUTI. 
71. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary international humanitarian law: questions and 
answers, August 15, 2005, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsflhtmV6BPK3X. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. (For example, no treaty expressly forbids attacks on civilian objects in non-international 
armed conflicts. According to the ICRC study, this is purely a child of customary international law. 
However, as with any law, customary international law is bound to be violated. The fact that such 
violations are not tolerated by States only strengthens the rule in question. For example, when a 
party attacks a civilian object, such attacks are not only criticized by various States, but frequently 
are justified by the offending party. Both the "condemnation and justification implicitly" enforce the 
idea that under customary law attacks on civilians are prohibited). 
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apply to those parties that are signatories. As explained above, some 
portions of treaties apply to parties who are not signatories through 
customary law. In non-international armed conflicts, Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions applies to all parties, as it is in essence a 
"catch all" article that applies regardless of the type of conflict. 
Additionally, Protocol II applies to those parties that are signatories. 
Otherwise, non-international armed conflicts are governed by customary 
law. 
The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic decision by the Appeals Chamber at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia discussed the application 
of customary law to non-international armed conflicts.74 In February of 
1994, Dusko Tadic was arrested after Bosnian exiles recognized him as 
one of the main Bosnian Serbs involved in the atrocities committed 
against Bosnian Muslims.75 One of the most difficult aspects of the 
Tadic case from a legal perspective, was that the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia had both internal and international characteristics.76 The 
Tadic decision proved to be ground-breaking because the Appeals 
Chamber concluded that the rules and principles governing international 
armed conflicts would now also apply to internal armed conflicts as a 
matter of customary law.77 Prior to this decision, internal armed conflicts 
were governed solely by Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 1I.78 
The Tadic decision essentially blurred the line between international and 
internal armed conflict so that the rules of customary law would now 
govern internal conflicts.79 The Appeals Chamber wrote that these 
customary laws specifically include: 
" .. . protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular 
from indiscriminate attacks, protection of civilian 
objects, in particular cultural property, protection of all 
those who do not (or no longer) take active part in the 
hostilities, as well as prohibition of means of warfare 
74. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion on 
Jurisdiction in the Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal, 'II 126 (Oct.2, 1995) (Appeal on 
Jurisdiction). 
75. Major Ian G. Corey, Note, The Fine Line between Policy and Custom: Prosecutor v. Tadic 
and the Customary International Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 166 Mil. L. Rev. 145, 146 (2000). 
76. Id. at 150. 
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proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of 
certain method of conducting hostilities. "80 
However, the Appeals Chamber clearly stated that not all of the rules of 
international conflict apply to internal conflicts and that this gradual 
extension is just that; therefore, the general meaning of the rules of 
international conflict, rather that the specific regulation, apply in internal 
conflicts.81 
In today's world, non-international armed conflicts are rising in both 
number and complexity. The application of international humanitarian 
law to non-international armed conflict is difficult, because as critical as 
customary law is to this practice, it has not been codified in any treaty. 
Although Additional Protocol IT provides abundant guidance above 
Common Article 3, it has not been universally accepted and much debate 
still exists as to which parts of Additional Protocol IT are indeed 
customary law. For this reason, the determination of a conflict as 
international versus non-international impacts the rules of humanitarian 
law to the greatest extent. 
E. APPLICATION OF DOMESTIC LAW 
Humanitarian law, by its very nature, overrides some domestic criminal 
and human rights law.82 However, from a legal perspective, when armed 
violence falls outside of an armed conflict, domestic and international 
criminal law applies rather than humanitarian law.83 As already 
determined, international armed conflict involves armed violence 
between States, and if the actions of Hezbollah are not attributed to that 
of a State, then any future Israeli-Hezbollah conflict will be a non-
international armed conflict.84 In non-international armed conflict, 
neither combatant nor prisoner of war status are guaranteed, because 
States are often unwilling to grant members of armed opposition groups 
immunity from prosecution under domestic law.85 Furthermore, in such 
80. Id. (citing Prosecutor V. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion 
on Jurisdiction in the Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal, 'lI 127 (Oct.2, 1995) (Appeal on 
Jurisdiction». 
81. Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion 
on Jurisdiction in the Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal, 'lI 126 (Oct.2, 1995) (Appeal on 
Jurisdiction». 
82. Rona Gabor, War. International Law. and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the 
Game in a New Century: Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of 
Existing Tools, 5 Chi. J. Int'l L. 499, 502 (2005). 
83. Int'I Comm. of the Red Cross, The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism, 
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conflicts, members of organized armed groups (such as combatants and 
guerrillas) are not entitled to special status or protection above and 
beyond customary international law, and as such, can be prosecuted 
under domestic criminal laws. 86 
In the conflict, Israeli prosecutors charged three Hezbollah fighters 
captured during the Israel-Lebanon conflict with the intention of trying 
them for murder and for being members of a terrorist organization.8? The 
decision to try the captured Hezbollah fighters under domestic Israeli law 
demonstrated that Israel refuses to view Hezbollah as a "legitimate 
fighting force. "88 Israel believes that members of Hezbollah are not 
entitled to prisoner of war status on capture because they do not meet the 
conditions of Article 4 or Articles 43 and 44 of Additional Protocol I, 
and therefore, domestic rather than international humanitarian law should 
govern the actions of Hezbollah.89 As will be demonstrated, this view 
seems to blatantly contradict the status Hezbollah has achieved both 
within Lebanon and in the eyes of the entire international community. 
IV. ANALYSIS UNDER GENEVA CONVENTIONS: 
IMPLICATIONS OF HEZBOLLAH'S CLASSIFICATION 
A. HEZBOLLAH:ASTATEAcTOR? 
Determining whether the acts of Hezbollah are attributable to Lebanon 
has tremendous effects on exactly how international humanitarian law 
would govern any future conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel. If 
Hezbollah's acts are attributable to Lebanon, then the conflict becomes 
an international one and the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols will apply.90 Therefore, if Hezbollah is a State actor, then both 
Israel and Lebanon would have to grant prisoner of war status to enemy 
combatants under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention.91 On the 
86. Id. 
87. Israel charges Hewollahfighters, BBC News, September 18,2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uklgofprffrf-f2fhilmiddle_eastf5355682.stm 
88. Id. 
89. Dr. Robbie Sabel, Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon and the Law of Armed Conflict, Univ. of 
Pittsburgh School of Law: Jurist Legal News and Research, July 25, 2006, 
ttp:lljurist.la w. pi tt.edufforumyl2006f07 fhezbollah-israel-lebanon-and-la woof. php 
90. Jonatha Somer, Acts of Non-State Armed Groups and the Law Governing Armed Conflict, 
ASIL Insight, August 24, 2006, http://www.asil.orgfinsightsl2006f08finsights060824.html (Another 
argument that a future Hezbollah - Israel conflict would be international is that Common Article 2 
would apply when Israel attacks Lebanese territory. Specifically, because Common Article 2 applies 
when there has been some kind of occupation of a High Contracting Party, even when there has been 
no resistance from the State that is being occupied). 
91. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Genevea Convention 111]. 
15
Bloom: Classification of Hezbollah
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008
76 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. XIV 
other hand, if Hezbollah's acts are not attributed to a State, this 
becomes a non-international armed conflict, and only Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions and customary law apply. This would mean 
that Hezbollah would have to meet the definition of "other militia" 
pursuant to Article 4, Section 2 to acquire prisoner of war status.92 
Another relevant part of the Geneva Conventions is Common Article 
Two, which applies when there has been a partial or total occupation of a 
High Contracting Party (or "State"). Since Hezbollah occupies 
essentially all of Southern Lebanon, this would mean that even if 
Hezbollah is a non-State actor, the Geneva Conventions may apply to 
that region of Lebanon. However, prior to discussing the application of 
the Geneva Conventions to a non-State versus State actor, it is necessary 
to determine whether Hezbollah is acting on behalf of Lebanon, or 
whether they are merely a militia group on Lebanese territory. 
1. Hezbollah is Implicitly Acting on Behalf of Lebanon 
Currently, the law of "State responsibility" and attribution is still in 
development.93 However, a number of international cases and the United 
Nations treaty, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
provide guidance.94 In Nicaragua V. United States, the International 
92. /d. (The detennination of whether this would be an international or non-international 
conflict also detennines of when humanitarian law applies. In international armed conflict, 
humanitarian law applies immediately after the first act of war or occupation occurs. However, in 
non-international armed conflicts, the level of conflict must be beyond "internal disturbances and 
tension" in order for humanitarian law to apply. Additionally, the classification of a future conflict 
would affect when a specific individual would be prosecuted from any resulting war crimes. Since 
grave breaches of the Conventions can only be committed in international armed conflicts, in such a 
conflict, all States would have an obligation to prosecute suspects, regardless of where the crime 
occurred). 
93. As stated in The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic_decision, "International humanitarian law does 
not contain any criteria unique to this body of law for establishing when a group of individuals may 
be regarded as being under the control of a State, that is, as acting as de facto State officials. 
Consequently, it is necessary to examine the notion of control by a State over individuals, laid down 
in general international law, for the purpose of establishing whether those individuals may be 
regarded as acting as de facto State officials. This notion can be found in those general international 
rules on State responsibility which set out the legal criteria for attributing to a State acts performed 
by individuals not having the formal status of State officials". 
94. The International Law Commission has had a long history in trying to codify the law of 
State responsibility which started at its very first session in 1949. The Commission actually began to 
study the topic in 1955. By 1963, the Commission agreed that a report on State responsibility agreed 
on the following: " (1) that priority should be given to the definitions of the general rules governing 
the international responsibility of the State; and (2) that, in defining these general rules, the 
experience and material gathered in certain special sectors, especially that of responsibility for 
injuries to the persons or property of aliens, should not be overlooked and that careful attention 
should be paid to the possible repercussions which developments in international law may have had 
on State responsibility." In 1969, the Commission was ready to start working on a first set of draft 
articles on the topic. The Commission stated that all future work on the topic of State responsibility 
would abide by the following guidelines: "(a) The Commission intended to confine its study of 
16
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Court of Justice held that a State may be held accountable for the actions 
of State agents acting within the scope of their official capacity.95 There 
are different legal outcomes when an act of a non-State group is 
attributed to a State, and when a State fails to diligently meet its 
obligation in preventing the acts of the non-State militia group acting on 
the territory of a particular case.96 Under the Nicaragua standard, in 
order for an act of an armed non-State group to be attributable to a 
particular State, the State must have "effective control", including 
"financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping."97 The 
"selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the 
whole of its operation" is not enough to meet the Nicaragua standard.98 
The Tadic decision, discussed supra, loosened the Nicaragua standard 
substantially. The court in Tadic held, 
" ... control by a State over subordinate armed forces or 
militias or paramilitary units may be of an overall 
character (and must comprise more than the mere 
provision of financial assistance or military equipment 
or training). This requirement, however, does not go so 
far as to include the issuing of specific orders by the 
State, or its direction of each individual operation. 
Under international law it is by no means necessary that 
the controlling authorities should plan all the operations 
of the units dependent on them, choose their targets, or 
give specific instructions concerning the conduct of 
international responsibility, for the time being, to the responsibility of States; (b) The Commission 
would first examine the question of the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. The 
question of responsibility arising from certain lawful acts, such as space and nuclear activities, 
would be examined as soon as the Commission's programme of work permitted; (c) The 
Commission agreed to concentrate its study on the determination of the principles which govern the 
responSIbility of States for internationally wrongful acts, maintaining a strict distinction between this 
task and that of defining the rules that place obligations on States, the violation of which may 
generate responsibility; (d) The study of the international responsibility of States would comprise 
two broad separate phases, the first covering the origin of international responsibility and the second 
the content of that responsibility" After numerous debates and drafts spanning an additional forty 
years, in December of 2001, The General Assembly "took note of the articles on responsibility of 
States for internationally wrongful acts." However, the adoption of these articles was moved to 
2004. In 2004, the General Assembly moved the item entitled "Responsibility of States for 
internationally wrongful acts" to its sixty-second session in 2007. A full summary of the history 
behind the articles is available at the International Commis'sion of Law website at 
http://untreaty.un.orglilclsummariesl9_6.htm. 
95. Maria Cristina Cardenas, Note, Columbia's Peace Process: The Continuous Search for 
Peace, 15 Aa. J. Int'! L. 273, 293 (2002) (citing Nicar. v. U.S~, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)); see also 
United States v. iran, 1980 ICJ 3, 19 Int'l Legal Materials 553 (1980); The Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadic, IT-94-I-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 38 In!'1 Legal Materials 1518 (1999). 
96. Jonatha Somer, Acts of Non-State Armed Groups and the Law Governing Armed Conflict, 
ASIL Insight, August 24, 2006, http://www.asil.orgiinsightsl2006/08/insights060824.htrnl. 
97. [d. (citing Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 ICJ 14,25 Int'l Legal Materials 1023 (1986)). 
98. [d. 
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military operations and any alleged violations of 
international humanitarian law. "99 
Chapter II of the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts discusses attribution of conduct to a particular State. loo Article 4 
States: 
"Article 4: Conduct of organs of a State 
I. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an 
act of that State under international law, whether the 
organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any 
other junctions, whatever position it holds in the 
organization of the State, and whatever its character as 
an organ of the central Government or of a territorial 
unit of the State. 
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that 
status in accordance with the internal law of the 
State. "101 
Although, as of today, the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts is not per se binding law, even though it is cited in many 
judicial decisions, including the Tadic decision supra. Based on the 
aforementioned standards, whether Hezbollah's acts can be attributable 
to Lebanon depends on whether Lebanon had the requisite control over 
Hezbollah's military operations, and whether Hezbollah acted in their 
capacity as an authority empowered by the Lebanese government. 
Upon initial inspection, it would seem that under the Tadic standard, 
there is no legally feasible way for Lebanon to have controlled Hezbollah 
because it did not provide the majority of Hezbollah's military 
equipment or training (particularly in light of the fact that the general 
sentiment is that both financial and military support for Hezbollah comes 
from Iran). However, upon further investigation, it becomes clear that 
99. Jd. (citing The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-I-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 38 Int'I 
Legal Materials 1518 (1999» (Paragraphs 98-145 of The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic fully discuss the 
Nicaragua standard, http://www.un.orglicty/tadic/appeaVjudgementlindex.htrn. It may also be 
helpful to look at the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility. The articles, 
arguably, encompass customary law and State that both "control and "acknowledgment" are basis 
for State responsibility). 
100. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56.83, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/l0 (Dec. 12,2001), 
http://untreaty.un.orglilc/textslinstrumentslenglishldraft%20articles/9 _6_200 1. pdf 
101. Jd. 
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Hezbollah has achieved such significant status in Lebanese politics and 
culture that they are no longer a "subordinate" group under Lebanon's 
control. In fact, Hezbollah has cemented their position in Lebanon to 
such a degree (with the government's consent and encouragement), that 
Lebanon and Hezbollah have indeed become one. 
Further, it is important to remember that in this conflict, Israel invaded 
Lebanon and attacked various parts of the country, thereby expanding 
their targets beyond the Hezbollah-occupied region of southern Lebanon. 
Israeli officials have stated numerous times that Israel was not merely 
responding to the actions of Hezbollah, but to the State of Lebanon as 
well. 102 However, the official Lebanese army did not responded to any 
military action by Israel nor did the army instigate any offensive military 
action. 103 
Lebanon did not investigate Hezbollah's activities, nor did Lebanon go 
after Nasrallah and try to stop his attacks on Israel. Israel was attacking 
Lebanon from every direction and the only party that responded was 
Hezbollah. Fundamentally, if a State were attacked by a neighboring 
State, the former would respond. If the attacked State has an army, it 
would send its troops to defend itself. However, Lebanon did not deploy 
its "official" army. Instead, Lebanon fully supported its real army, 
Hezbollah, to defend the country against Israel. 
Those in support of the argument that Hezbollah is a non-State actor 
would argue that mere passive permission on the part of Lebanon is 
insufficient for attribution. However, from a historical perspective, 
Lebanon has not been a "passive" government. On the contrary, the 
Lebanese government has been vocal, and based on the experience of the 
Lebanese Civil War, has not allowed one group to dominate. For 
example, when ex-Prime Minister Hariri was assassinated, the Lebanese 
government publicly criticized Hezbollah for refusing to demilitarize. 104 
During this time, the multi-fractioned Lebanese government was very 
much against allowing one group, even the largest one in the country, to 
maintain its military force. However, in this conflict, Lebanon did not 
stop Hezbollah from using this military force, nor did it stop Hezbollah 
from upgrading to modern weapons and technologies. Decisions about 
war are generally made by the sovereign Lebanese government. 
However, not only did Lebanon allow Hezbollah to engage in an armed 
102. Human Rights Watch, Questions and Answers on Hostilities Between Israel and 
Hezbollah, July 31,2006, http://hrw.org/englishldocs/2006/07/17I1ebanoI3748.htm. 
103. Id. 
104. Saban Center Interview, supra note 33. 
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conflict with Israel, but even in the year after the conflict, the Lebanese 
government had not questioned Hezbollah's actions. Lebanon's implicit 
support of Hezbollah, and refusal to intervene in any manner, implies 
that Hezbollah was indeed acting on behalf of Lebanon, and was 
therefore, a State actor. 
Furthermore, in the 1990's Lebanon and Israel entered into an agreement 
not to target civilians in any future armed conflicts. The rules arising out 
of that agreement have governed the Israeli-Lebanese border dispute. lOS 
Although the State of Lebanon and Israel entered into this agreement, in 
reality, any border dispute has always been between Israel and 
Hezbollah. As such, Lebanon knowingly has and continues to allow 
Hezbollah to control the border between Israel and Lebanon. It seems, at 
the very least unusual for a State to allow any guerrilla, terrorist, or 
militia group to control its borders when its own army is capable of 
doing so. If Lebanon is comfortable allowing an organized military 
group to both control and defend its borders, this only further supports 
the notion that Hezbollah is a Lebanese-sponsored State actor. 
Finally, Hezbollah themselves purport to act on behalf of Lebanon. On 
August 3, 2006, Hezbollah's chief Nasrallah made a televised offer to 
Israel to stop flring Hezbollah rockets in exchange for an end to Israeli 
air strikes on Lebanon.106 However, Nasrallah warned that Hezbollah 
would flre rockets at Tel Aviv if Israel attacked Beirut. 107 Nasrallah 
stated: 
"If you attack our cities, villages and capital, we will 
react. And any time you decide to stop your attacks on 
our cities, villages and infrastructure, we will not fire 
rockets on any Israeli settlement or city. Naturally, we 
105. Lara Deeb, Hizballah: A Primer, Middle East Reporter Online, July 31, 2006, 
http://www.merip.orglmero/mero073106.html; see also see also Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 
Civilian Pawns:Laws of War Violations and the Use of Weapons on the Israel-Lebanon Border, May 
1996, http://hrw.orglreportsIl996Ilsrael.htm ('These "rules of the game" came out of Israel's 
bombing Beirut a number of times in the nineties, causing relatively large civilian deaths. For 
example, in 1996, Israel bombed a United Nations bunker in Qana, Lebanon. Many civilians had 
taken refuge in the bunker and as a result of the attack, 106 civilians died). 
106. Andrew McGregor, Hezbollah's Rocket Strategy, 4 Terrorism Monitor 16 (2006). 
107. Id.; see also Anmesty Int'l, IsraellLebanon: Under fire: Hizbullah's attacks on northern 
Israel, September 14, 2006, hnp:llweb.amnesty.orgllibraryllndexlENGMDE020252006 (On July 14, 
2006 Nasrallah stated, "You wanted open warfare, and we are going into open warfare. We are ready 
for it, a war on every level." Two days Hezbollah bombed the city of Haifa even though a large 
Arabic population resides in Haifa. After another attack on Haifa in August, Nasrallah stated that 
Hezbollah bombed Haifa in "response to Zionist attacks against the southern suburbs [of Beirut] and 
the rest of the Lebanese territory ... "). 
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would rather, in case of fighting, fight soldier to soldier 
on the group and battlefield. "108 
81 
Hezbollah's repetitive use of the word "our" implies that Hezbollah 
believes it was acting on behalf of Lebanon. Moreover, most of 
Nasrallah's speeches aired on the very popular Hezbollah television 
station al-Manar. The fact that the Lebanese government has constantly 
failed to act in response to Hezbollah, only confirms that Lebanon was 
indeed sponsoring Hezbollah's activity with full knowledge of 
Hezbollah's strategic plan and military objectives. 
Hezbollah's accomplishments with respect to the conflict only support 
the notion that Hezbollah has essentially morphed into the true Lebanese 
army. After all, it was Hezbollah and not the "official" Lebanese army 
that responded to each Israeli attack. Hezbollah was able to abduct two 
Israeli soldiers, bomb a tank which crossed the border in order to follow 
the kidnappers, and conduct an overall military campaign into regions of 
Israel that were never reached by weapons from Lebanon. Additionally, 
Hezbollah has fixed training bases, rocket-launching facilities, and 
trained artillerymen. 109 A senior United States military official stated, in 
reference to Hezbollah, that "[the] analysis around here is they have 
more expertise than the Lebanese military."11O The Lebanese army is 
"lightly armed, poorly organized for maneuver warfare and lacked both a 
meaningful air force and modem-based air defence assets."lll The 
Lebanese army has 70,000 men, and while still recovering from twenty 
years of civil war, it is the only Lebanese military force capable of any 
serious military action because Lebanon has no real air force or navy.ll2 
Moreover, Hezbollah has demonstrated some serious technological 
advancement in the conflict. Not only did Hezbollah utilize cluster 
munitions for the first time, but they used the Chinese-made Type-81 
122mm rocket (an inaugural use of this type of rocket in the world).ll3 
108. Amnesty Int'!, Israel/Lebanon: Under fire: Hizbullah's attacks on northern Israel, 
September 14, 2006, http://web.amnesty.orgllibrarylIndexlENGMDE020252006 (citing a speech 
broadcast by Al-Manar TV station, Arabic text: Ad-Diyar website, IS July 2006 pdf edition, 
English text: www.islamicdigesLnetlv611contentiviewl1870101 and 
www.aimislam.comlforums/index.php?showtopic=457). 
109. Peter Spiegel & Sebastian Rotella, Hezbollah's Skill More Military Than Militia, Los 
Angeles Times, July 20, 2006, http:/www.iiss.orglindex.asp?pgid=14309. 
110. Id. 
111. Estanislao Oziewicz, What rules govern the conflict?, The Int'l Institute for Strategic 
Studies, July 19, 2006, http://www.iiss.orglwhats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2006/july-
2006/what-rules-govern-the-conflict. 
112. Id. 
113. Human Rights Watch, Lebanon/Israel: Hezbollah Hit Israel with Cluster Munitions 
During Conflict, October 19, 2006, http://hrw.orglenglishldocs12006110118Ilebanol4412.htm 
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This shows that Hezbollah is not only capable of being a national army, 
but has potentially become one. 114 
The strongest argument that Hezbollah is not acting on behalf of 
Lebanon is that Iran and Syria are the ones assisting Hezbollah with both 
financing as a whole, and military operations specifically. As such, an 
argument could be made that under the Nicaragua and Tadic standard, 
Hezbollah is not a State-sponsored actor, but rather an organized political 
government that is merely occupying Lebanese territory and supporting 
itself with the funds of other States. This argument has validity because 
Hezbollah is a recognized political party in both Syria and Iran. 
Additionally, during the conflict, an Iranian military source revealed to 
the London Arabic daily newspaper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, that Iran 
provided overall military support and weapons to Hezbollah "in defense 
of Lebanon."115 Specifically, the Iranian official stated: 
"The Revolutionary Guards .... equipped Hezbollah with 
mobile bases, [i.e.] medium-sized trucks that can carry 
and launch missiles. Between 1992 and 2005, Hizbullah 
received approximately 11,500 missiles and rockets, 400 
short- and medium- range pieces of artillery, [and] 
Aresh, Nun and Hadid rockets. Last year, Hizbullah first 
received a shipment of large 'Uqab missiles with 
333-millimeter warheads, and an enormous supply of 
SAM7 shoulder-[fired] anti-aircraft missiles as well as 
C802 missiles, copied from Chinese missiles, two of 
(Cluster munitions are particularly dangerous to civilians because they spread "submunitions" over a 
very large area thereby guaranteeing casualties. Moreover, cluster munitions leave behind a large 
quantity of "duds" that essentially turn into landmines and either kill or injure civilians after the 
conflict has seized. These types of weapons have also been used in the iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Kosovo conflict, many nations have joined to prohibit the use of cluster munitions due to the danger 
posed to civilians during and after a particular conflict. In November of 2006, The Review 
Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons began looking into this problem). 
114. Saban Center Interview, supra note 33. 
115. Dr. Robbie Sabel, Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon and the Law of Armed Conflict, University 
of Pittsburgh School of Law: Jurist Legal News and Research, July 25, 2006, 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edulforumyl2006/07Ihezbollah-israel-lebanon-and-law-of.php; see also 
Andrew McGregor, Hezbollah's Rocket Strategy, 4 Terrorism Monitor 16, (2006) (The introduction 
of long-range Iranian Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets has allowed Hezbollah to expand their targets beyond 
the thinly-populated area in Northern Israel. The Fajr-3 has a range of 45 kilometers and carries a 45 
kilogram warhead. Another grave concern to Israel, is Hezbollah's possession of the Iranian Zelzal 2 
missile which has a range of 60-240 miles and would, in effect, put all Israeli cities within range of 
southern Lebanon). 
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which were used in the attack on the Israeli ship the day 
before yesterday. "116 
83 
A senior United States military official commented that the missiles used 
in the attack on the Israeli ship off the coast of Beirut were "fired by 
Hezbollah themselves, [and] they would have had to have training in 
these missile technologies."ll7 The official also noted that such training 
would probably come from Iranian military schools or from people 
trained in Iran. liS According to a London-based International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Hezbollah possesses 13,000 missiles and rockets, 
11,000 of which were shipped from Iran. I 19 
While it is clear that Iran has and continues to provide military support to 
Hezbollah, Iran does not dictate Hezbollah's behavior, nor does it direct 
the group's actions. 120 Although Hezbollah faithfully follows the 
traditional "rule of the clerics" promoted by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, 
while Iran still provides some military and financial support, Hezbollah's 
relationship with Iran is now based upon consultations with Iranian 
leaders, rather than on Hezbollah members acting as Iranian puppets. 121 
Iran may have had more control over the group at the beginning, 
however, Iran has lost much of that control because its desire to 
influence Lebanese politics have strengthened Lebanese nationalism and 
support of Hezbollah. 122 Although Iran has lost a great deal of control 
over Hezbollah's members, it still provides them with military support 
and training. Does this fact lead to the conclusion that Hezbollah is 
acting on behalf of Iran? The Tadic standard requires "overall control" 
beyond merely financing or military support in order for Iran to have 
control over Hezbollah. The bottom line is that under the Tadic 
standard, the mere fact that Iran has provided military support to 
Hezbollah does not negate the idea that Hezbollah is acting on behalf of 
Lebanon. 
116. Dr. Robbie Sabel, Hezbollah. Israel. Lebanon and the Law of Armed Conflict, University 
of Pittsburgh School of Law: Jurist Legal News and Research, July 25, 2006, 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edulforurny/2006/07lhezbollah-israel-Iebanon-and-Iaw-of.php 
117. Peter Spiegel & Sebastian Rotella, Hezbollah's Skill More Military Than Militia, Los 
Angeles Times, July 20, 2006, http:/www.iiss.orglindex.asp?pgid=14309. 
118. Id. 
119. Estanislao Oziewicz, What rules govern the conflict?, The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies. July 19.2006, 
http://www.iiss.orglwhats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2006/july-2006/what-rules-govem-
the-conflict (There are also reports that the largest weapons in Hezbollah' s missile arsenal are likely 
to be at least partially manned by members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards). 
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Lebanon has pennitted Iran to pass weapons and potentially train 
Hezbollah on their territory. In order for Iran to ship weapons to 
Hezbollah, they would have to use Lebanese ports; therefore, Lebanon 
must have been aware that Hezbollah was obtaining weapons. Similarly, 
the Taliban government pennitted Al Queda to conduct "planning, 
training, and financing operations" within Taliban-controlled territory.123 
The United States, relying on the draft of the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts attributed responsibility for AI Queda's 
actions on September 11, 2001 to the Taliban regime because of the 
latter's tolerance of AI Queda's activity on their sovereign territory.124 
The sovereignty of a State implies an obligation to prevent that State's 
territory from becoming a "staging area for armed attacks."I25 With this 
in mind, Lebanon had the responsibility to assure that Hezbollah was not 
using Lebanese territory to prepare for attacks against Israel. Lebanon 
was unlikely merely a "passive" player that did not provide any 
financial aid to Hezbollah. 
Hezbollah occupies a large part of Lebanon and provides services to 
many of the country's Shiia majority. Why would Lebanon allow a 
group to have so much control without providing it with some kind of 
funding? Moreover, it seems equally unlikely that the Lebanese 
government was unaware of Hezbollah's military plans in the conflict. 
After all, when Israel attacked Lebanon, the responding military power 
was Hezbollah. From a purely logical perspective, the Lebanese 
government would want to know how Hezbollah is defending the 
nation's civilians. 
Undoubtedly, the argument that Hezbollah is acting on behalf of 
Lebanon is not purely black and white, particularly in light of the fact 
that State responsibility is an area of law that is still highly debated in the 
international community. However, Hezbollah has become an intrinsic 
part of the Lebanese government, social structure, and culture. The 
Lebanese government did nothing to curb Hezbollah' s acts of aggression 
against Israel, nor have they looked into Hezbollah's activity since. 
Lebanon has given the rest of the world the perception that when Israel 
123. Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Rule of Law, 25 Hastings Int'I & 
Compo L. Rev. 303, 306 (2002). 
124. Id. (Many uncertainties still exist concerning the rules of attribution for acts conducted by 
guerrilla forces. The draft articles on Responsibility of Staes for internationally wrongful acts are not 
completely clear on the issue either). 
125. Id. ("The United Nations General Assembly defined "aggression" as "the sending by or on 
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed 
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to [acts of aggression committed directly by 
the State], or of its substantial involvement therein. G.A. Res. 3314, Dec. 14, 1974, U.N. Doc. 
N9631 (1975)). 
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attacks Lebanon, Hezbollah defends. As stated in Article 7 of 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: 
"Article 7: Excess of authority or contravention of 
instructions 
The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or 
entity empowered to exercise elements of the 
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the 
State under international law if the organ, person or 
entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its 
authority or contravenes instructions. "126 
Lebanon has empowered Hezbollah to do what the Lebanese government 
is supposed to control. Specifically, it has allowed Hezbollah to make 
decisions in times of armed conflict and provide a military defense for 
the country. Therefore, Hezbollah is a State actor by implication. 
2. Application of the Geneva Conventions 
If Hezbollah is a State actor, then all of the Geneva Conventions would 
apply to a future conflict between Israel and Lebanon, as both States are 
signatory parties to the Conventions. Additional Protocol I would also 
apply to Lebanon, as it is a signing party to that treaty. The application 
of Additional Protocol I to Israel is a more complex issue, as Israel is not 
a signatory to Protocol I. Under these circumstances, customary law 
plays a crucial role within international humanitarian law. 
States cannot avoid responsibility by merely arguing that they are not a 
party to a certain international treaty. 127 This is because numerous 
principles laid out in the Protocols are considered customary law, as they 
are supported by both non-signatory and signatory States to a particular 
international treaty.128 With respect to Protocol I, Israel could try arguing 
126. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56.83, U.N. Doc. 
Al56/10 (Dec. 12,2001), 
http://untreaty. un.orglilc/texts/instrurnents/englishldraft% 20articles/9 _ 6_200 I. pdf. 
127. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism, 
http://www.icrc.orglWeblEnglsiteengO.nsflhtmllterrorism-ihl-210705. 
128. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Study on Customory International Humonitarian Law, July 
21, 2005, http://www.icrc.org Iweb/englsiteengO.nsflhtmllcustomary-law-statement-210705 (The 
study on customary law is the outcome of eight years of research covering State practices from all 
over the world. The idea behind the study was to capture the "clearest possible 'photograph '" of 
modem customary law. The study would include those principles as "customary" that were 
supported by all States and identify those rules and principles still debated. The parts of treaties that 
caused disagreement were not included as the rules of customary law (for example, the presumption 
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that unlike the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I is not as 
strongly rooted in customary law. However, unlike the Geneva 
Conventions which have been signed by all parties, the Protocols have 
not gained such universal recognition. 129 However, not only do many 
States uphold the fundamental principles in both Protocols, but a 
substantial number of States are signatories to the Protocols. 
If Hezbollah is determined to be a non-State Actor, then Common Article 
3 would be the only applicable part of the Geneva Conventions. This 
Article lays out the fundamental rules of a non-international conflict and 
protects those individuals that are no longer taking an active part in the 
armed conflict.130 The Article prohibits murder, mutilation, torture, cruel 
treatment, the taking of hostages, and outrages upon personal dignity (in 
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment).131 The Article also 
requires that sentences be passed with the observance of "all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples."132 The protections of Common Article 3 have become so 
fundamental in the laws of armed conflict, that they are now referred to 
as "elementary considerations of humanity" that must be observed in any 
type of armed conflict. 133 Common Article 3 is the foundation of 
international humanitarian law and applies regardless of the type of 
conflict or the classification of the individual. 
In addition to Common Article 3, it is possible that Common Article 2 
would apply in a non-international conflict. Article 2 states that: 
"In addition to the provisions which shall be 
implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall 
apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the 
of civilian status in situations where doubt about such a status exists). The 5,OOO-page study 
produced 161 rules of customary law). 
129. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, A milestone for international humanitarian law, 
September 22, 2006, 
http://www.icrc.orglweb/engisiteengO.nsflhtmIlgeneva-conventions-Statement-220906. 
130. Geneva Convention ill, supra note 89, art. 3. 
131. Id. 
132. /d. 
133. In!'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Developments of us policy and legislation towards 
detainees: the ICRC position, October 19, 2006, 
http://www.icrc.orglweb/engisiteengO.nsflhtrnlall/kelIenberger -interview-191 006 ?opendocument 
(Preserving the integrity of Common Article 3 is extremely important because it applies to the 
treatment of all individuals who fall in enemy hands without any regard to how the conflict or the 
individual is classified. Common Article 3, along with the rest of the Geneva Conventions, was 
written after one of the darkest period in time. The "totality" of Article 3 reflects that). 
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High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them. 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or 
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting 
Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed 
resistance. "134 
87 
The language of Article 2 would make it applicable to Hezbollah in a 
non-international armed conflict because Hezbollah occupies essentially 
all of southern Lebanon (a territory of a High Contracting Party), and the 
occupation was met without resistance. However, according to Jean 
Pictet, one of the main authors of the Geneva Conventions, the second 
paragraph of Article 2 "was intended to fill the gap left by paragraph 
1."135 Pictet continues to explain that "paragraph 2 was designed to 
protect the interests of protected persons in occupations achieved without 
hostilities when the government of the occupied country considered that 
armed resistance was useless."\36 This explanation of the seemingly 
all-encompassing meaning of paragraph 2 also accounts for why 
Common Article 2 rarely applies in modem armed conflicts and why it 
also would not apply to Hezbollah. Although Hezbollah has occupied 
Lebanese territory for decades, it has neither achieved such occupation 
without hostilities, nor has Lebanon ever considered an armed resistance 
to Hezbollah as futile. As a matter of fact, as illustrated in the 2006 
conflict, Lebanon has allowed Hezbollah to act on Lebanon's behalf, to 
control the Lebanese border, and to impact every aspect of Lebanese 
social and political culture. 
Similar to Common Article 2, it would seem (at least on its face) that 
Article 4 of Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War may also apply to Hezbollah in a non-international armed 
conflict: 
"(2) Members of other militias and members of other 
volunteer corps, including those organized resistance 
movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and 
operating in or outside their own territory, even if this 
territory is occupied provided that such militias or 
134. Geneva Convention ill, supra note 89, art. 2. 
135. Michael W. Reisman & James Silk, Which Law Applies to the Afghan Conflict?, 
82 AJ.I.L. 459, 461 (July, 1988) (citing 3 The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 
Commentary 22-23 (1. Pictet ed. 1952-60) (4 vols., one on each Convention». 
136. [d. 
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volunteer corps, including such organized resistance 
movements, fulfill the following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for 
his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at 
a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of war. "137 
Nevertheless, Article 4 would not provide significant protection to 
Hezbollah in a non-international armed conflict. Even if Hezbollah 
"belongs" to Lebanon for the purposes of this law, Hezbollah does not 
fulfill all of the conditions required for protection under Article 4. 
Hezbollah meets the first element because the group is commanded by a 
person who is responsible for his subordinates. It could also meet the 
second requirement of having an identifying sign or uniform that is 
easily recognizable. Although the group does not actually have such a 
sign, due to the modern nature of armed conflict, armed forces are not 
required to distinguish themselves by wearing a uniform and could, for 
example, carry arms openly to sufficiently distinguish themselves. 138 
However, Hezbollah (like many other similar organizations) does not 
carry arms openly, but rather blends in with civilians. This is one of the 
main reasons why Hezbollah fighters are difficult to capture and 
distinguish. 139 Therefore, Hezbollah does not meet the third requirement 
of Article 4, because Hezbollah members, as a matter of strategy, do not 
carry weapons openly. Hezbollah would also have difficulty meeting the 
fourth requirement of Article 4 because it has repeatedly violated the 
laws and customs of war (as reported by the ICRe, Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International, major newspapers, and in numerous legal 
137. Geneva Convention ill, supra note 89, art. 4 (Additionally, Article 5 dictates that: "Should 
any doubt arise as to whether, persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the 
hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Articie 4, such persons shall 
enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by 
a competent tribunal." Even with Article 4 and 5 of the Geneva Conventions, according to Amnesty 
International, neither Israel nor Hezbollah have treated captured combatants as prisoners of war). 
138. 1n!'1 Comm. of the Red Cross, The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism, 
May 21, 2005, http://www.icrc.orglWeblEngisiteengO.nsflhtmlalllterrorism-ihl-210705. 
139. Israel has used this as a defense on numerous occasions, claiming that they did not violate 
the laws of armed conflict because they were not targeting civilians but rather Hezbollah. 
Nonetheless, the majority opinion, based on both the Geneva Conventions and the fundamental 
principle of customary law, holds Israel responsible for indiscriminate attacks on Lebanese civilians. 
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opinions). For example, in the 2006 conflict, Hezbollah indiscriminately 
attacked civilians utilizing-weapons such as "Katyusha" rockets, which 
are so technologically lacking that they frequently miss their supposed 
military targets and kill or injure civilians instead. 
Unlike an international armed conflict where the Geneva Conventions 
and parts of Additional Protocol I would apply to Hezbollah, in a 
non-international conflict, only Common Article 3 would apply. As 
always, customary law would also govern Hezbollah's conduct. 
However, neither Common Article 2 nor Article 4 of Geneva Convention 
III would apply. Based on the analysis thus far, it would seem that in a 
non-international armed conflict, Hezbollah would not be able to obtain 
prisoner of war protection because they do no meet the requirements of 
"organized militia" under Article 4. 
B. "COMBATANT" CLASSIFICATION 
Guerrilla warfare has been a part of armed conflict for many centuries, 
and is currently the most common form of warfare. 140 Prior to Additional 
Protocol I, the treatment of guerrillas was governed by Article 4 of the 
Third Geneva Convention. One of the main problems with the guerrilla 
classification is that guerrillas will infrequently meet the requirements of 
Article 4. Usually, guerilla fighters are part-time soldiers who have to 
live as "normal civilians" in order to survive in their respective 
communities. 141 
Another point of concern under the guerrilla classification is that an 
occupying power can deny prisoner of war treatment to captured 
guerrillas based on a number of exceptions that exist in the Third Geneva 
Convention of 1949.142 First, the occupying party would refuse to 
recognize the party to the conflict that the guerrillas are a part of. 143 
Second, normally, members of armies do not lose their prisoner of war 
status no matter what kind of violations of humanitarian law they 
commit. l44 However, guerrillas are held to a higher standard, and under 
Article 4, may be denied prisoner of war status because the captors 
140. John Dwight Ingram, The Geneva Convention is Woefully Outdated, 23 Penn St. Int'l L. 
Rev. 79 (2004) (citing as examples the conflicts in Somalia and Afghanistan). 
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believe that the guerrilla group (in whole or in part) has not sufficiently 
complied with the laws of armed conflict. 145 
As a response to some of these issues, Articles 43 through 47 of 
Additional Protocol I created a uniform set of rules applicable to all 
combatants (both regular and irregular). The Articles prescribe some, 
albeit limited, exceptions for those guerrillas that take advantage of their 
civilian status and conceal weapons while moving into position for an 
attack. 146 Article 43 defines the term "combatant," stating (in relevant 
part): 
"1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of 
all organized armed forces, groups and units which are 
under a command responsible to that Party for the 
conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is 
represented by a government or an authority not 
recognized by an adverse Party. "147 
Article 44 discusses that combatants are guaranteed prisoner of war 
status, stating (in relevant part): 
"1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls 
into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of 
war. 
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian 
population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are 
obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a 
military operation preparatory to an attack. 
Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed 
conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an 
armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall 
retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such 
situations, he carries his arms openly: 
(a) during each military engagement, and 
145. [d. 
146. Id. at 770. 
147. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Intemational Anned Conflicts (Protocol n art 43, December 12,1977,1125 
V.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol 1]. 
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(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary 
while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding 
the launching of an attack in which he is to participate. 
4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse 
Party while failing to meet the requirements set forth in 
the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his right 
to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be 
given protections equivalent in all respects to those 
accorded to prisoners of war by the Third 
Convention ... "148 
91 
These articles also give guerrillas and other irregular armed forces 
presumptive prisoner of war status that would no longer depend on 
whether the occupying power deemed them worthy of such status. 149 
Additionally, Article 44 clarified that combatants (including guerrillas) 
must distinguish themselves from the civilian population only while they 
are engaged in an attack or in preparation for an attack. 150 
Of significant importance is that Protocol I grants prisoner of war status 
to those individuals who lawfully participate in armed conflicts.l5l Under 
Protocol I, to be a "lawful" member of an armed force (whether a 
guerrilla group or lawful combatant), armed forces must be organized, be 
under a command responsible to that party, and be subject to an internal 
disciplinary system that enforces compliance with humanitarian law. 152 
Further, members must distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population in order to be entitled to prisoner of war status. 153 
As explained supra, Israel does not and would not want to recognize 
Hezbollah as anything other than a terrorist group in any future armed 
conflicts. Israel would classify Hezbollah members as terrorists that do 
not warrant any protections under Additional Protocol I because they 
cannot be given combatant status. Since Additional Protocol I only 
provides protection to those groups that act on behalf of a State or entity 
that is subject to international law, terrorist groups acting on their own 
behalf do not receive prisoner of war protection. 154 According to the 
148. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 145, art. 44 
149. 75 A.l.l.L. at 771. 
150. Id. at 774. 
151. In!'1 Comm. of the Red Cross, The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism, 
May 21, 2005, http://www.icrc.orglWeblEngisiteengO.nsflhtmlaIVterrorism-ihl-21 0705. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism, 
May 21, 2005, http://www.icrc.orglWeblEngisiteengO.nsflhtmlaIVterrorism-ihl-21070S. 
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ICRC, Additional Protocol I does not grant prisoner of war status to 
those who unlawfully participate in hostilities because Protocol I 
recognizes and protects only those organizations (and their respective 
members) who act either on behalf of a State or an "entity" that meets the 
criteria established by the Protocol and, therefore, are governed by 
internationallaw.155 
Israel would argue that Hezbollah members are not combatants because 
Hezbollah is not the official Lebanese army. Specifically, Lebanon did 
not explicitly recognize Hezbollah as its armed forces in the conflict, nor 
did Hezbollah wear the uniform of the Lebanese army. Israel would also 
rely on the fact that Hezbollah's fighters (and their weapons) are hidden 
among civilians. 156 Therefore, Israel would argue that this clearly 
supports the notion that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization, rather than 
a State party or combatant. 
However, Israel's potential arguments lack merit with respect to 
Hezbollah's combatant status. Hezbollah's ability in the conflict to 
utilize complex weapons provides strong basis for the argument that it 
has transitioned from guerilla group to a viable military power. For 
Hezbollah to qualify as a "combatant" under Article 43, it would have to 
be an organized unit which would be under a command responsibility to 
Lebanon for the conduct of its members. Hezbollah is clearly an 
organized unit. As illustrated above, throughout the conflict, Hezbollah 
was the only group fighting on behalf of Lebanon in defense of Israeli 
attacks. This implies that Hezbollah was under command responsibility 
to Lebanon for all of its military strategies and activities. 
However, even as combatants, Hezbollah would very likely be unable to 
receive prisoner of war protections because of the manner in which they 
conduct themselves in armed conflicts. Hezbollah's policy and the secret 
to its effectiveness is the mariner in which the group blends in with the 
civilian population. Even if Hezbollah is compromised of combatants, 
its members do not carry arms openly during military engagements. 
Therefore, even if Hezbollah were to receive combatant status pursuant 
to Article 44, Paragraph 3(a), it fails to meet one of the requirements 
necessary to attain prisoner of war status as a combatant. Even if 
155. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross. The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism. 
May 21. 2005. http://www.icrc.orglWeblEnglsiteengO.nsUhtmlaIlfterrorism-ihl-210705 (The ICRC 
goes further stating that the Protocol purposefully excludes "private wars" in the same manner that 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1907 Hague Regulations have done in regards to the laws of 
war on land). 
156. Anthony Dworkin. The Middle East Crisis and International Law. Crimes of War Project. 
July 18. 2006. http://www.crimesof war.orglonnews/news-middleeast.html. 
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Hezbollah's members are considered to be terrorists rather than 
combatants, they would still receive the fundamental protections laid out 
in Common Article 3 and would be subject to customary law 10 any 
future armed conflict. 
The analysis of whether Hezbollah deserves "combatant" status changes 
dramatically in a non-international conflict because Additional Protocol I 
would not apply. Although Common Article 3 would still apply in a 
non-international armed conflict, Hezbollah would mainly have to abide 
by customary law. Additional Protocol II also provides guidance in this 
type of armed conflict. Since Lebanon is a party to Additional Protocol 
II, and Hezbollah would be acting on the State's behalf as combatants, 
Hezbollah would have to abide by all the rules laid out in Protocol II. 
These include: prohibitions against certain inhumane acts against 
individuals who do not take a direct part in the armed conflict; respect 
and protection for the wounded; and special protection of children. 157 
C. "MERCENARY" CLASSIFICATION 
Mercenarism has long been one of the elements of traditional armed 
conflict.l58 Generally, mercenarism is strongly discouraged under 
internationallaw.159 By their very definition, mercenaries pose a threat 
because they intensify existing conflicts. For example, the United 
Nations has stated that mercenarism is a destabilizing force and impedes 
the sovereign rights of both the people and the State.160 Additionally, 
under the International Criminal Court, traditional mercenaries may be 
tried for war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. 161 
However, an individual who technically meets the definition of 
"mercenary" can still obtain prisoner of war status by enlisting in the 
armed forces of the hiring party until the conflict ends.162 For this 
reason, the definition of "mercenary" in Additional Protocol I has been 
criticized. 163 In 1989, the International Convention against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries tried to 
expand the definition by shifting to the purpose for why a particular 
157. Geneva Protocol II, supra note 60, art .. 4,7, 13. 
158. James R. Coleman, Constraining Modem Mercenarism, 55 Hastings L.J. 1493, 1496 
(2004). 
159. Id. at 1493. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. David Kassebaum, Note, A Question of Facts - The Legal Use of Private Security Firms in 
Bosnia, 38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 581, 589 (2000). 
163. Id. at 590. 
33
Bloom: Classification of Hezbollah
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008
94 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. XN 
individual was hired.164 However, although this was adopted by the 
General Assembly, the "Mercenary Convention" has not received 
sufficient ratification as only seventeen (rather than twenty-two) nations 
have ratified it.165 Neither Israel nor Lebanon have ratified the 
Convention. 166 
One could argue that Hezbollah classifies as a group of mercenaries if 
one believes that Hezbollah is merely being paid to act out the wishes of 
a State, whether Lebanon or Iran. 167 Additional Protocol I, Article 47 
lays out six elements defining a "mercenary" as any person who: 
"(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to 
fight in an armed conflict; 
(b) d.')es, infact take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially 
by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, 
by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material 
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or 
paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the 
armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a 
resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict; and 
(j) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to 
the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed 
forces. "168 
Article 47 also removes the protection of combatant or prisoner of war 
status from mercenaries provided that an individual cumulatively meets 
all of the definitional elements above. 169 
164. [d. (citing International Convention against the Recruiunent, Use, Financing and Training 
of Mercenaries, U.N. GAOR, 72nd pie. Mtg., U.N. Doc. AlRES/44/34 (1989)). 
165. [d. at 591. 
166. As of 1999, the 17 parties that have ratified the treaty are Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belarus, 
Cameroon, Cyprus, Georgia, Italy, Maldives, Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, 
Suriname, Togo, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
167. Due to their limited financial involvement with Hezbollah, as of today, Syria does not 
seem a likely State to hire Hezbollah as their mercenaries. 
168. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 145, art. 47. 
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An argument could be made that Additional Protocol I would not apply 
to a future armed conflict because Lebanon signed the treaty, and 
Hezbollah has no international standing or ability to be a party to 
international treaties. While this would be true (as explained above), the 
international community and the majority of States (including all the 
ones that have ratified Protocol I) condemn mercenarism. Therefore, this 
particular part of Additional Protocol I would apply to Hezbollah under 
customary law. Article 47 summarizes and codifies the definitional 
elements that have come to be associated with mercenarism. Therefore, 
whether Hezbollah can be defined as a mercenary group can be analyzed 
using the framework laid out in Article 47. 
The first element of Article 47 requires a member of Hezbollah to be 
recruited locally or abroad in order to engage in an armed conflict with 
Israel. Although this may have been true initially when Hezbollah's 
dependence on Iran and Syria was at its peak, this is no longer true today. 
Neither Iran, Lebanon nor Syria recruit Hezbollah in order to fight Israel. 
Quite the contrary, Hezbollah organized the conflict in question and 
continued to take full credit for every attack thereafter. Even if Iran 
helped Hezbollah by providing weapons, Hezbollah has infiltrated 
Lebanon to the point that it does not need to be "recruited" in order to 
carry out aggressions against Israel. 
The second element would require Hezbollah to take part in the 
hostilities, which Hezbollah has clearly done. However, the third 
element requires that Hezbollah be "materially compensated" for 
maintaining an armed conflict with Israel above and beyond members of 
the hiring State's regular armed forces. In the conflict, Hezbollah carried 
out the entire war without the involvement of either Lebanon's or Iran's 
armed forces. 
Potentially, an argument could be made that Iran's armed forces were 
indeed involved in the fighting. Quite possibly some members of Iran's 
army aided Hezbollah by physically engaging in the conflict. However, 
even Iran's own military official admitted that Iran's major part in the 
2006 conflict was to provide Hezbollah with weapons, not military 
manpower. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Iran, Lebanon, or 
Syria paid Hezbollah compensation at all (either above or below what 
they would pay their own armed forces). 
169. 38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. at 589 (citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 47). 
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Since Hezbollah is, at the very least, a resident of Lebanon (and Lebanon 
controlled and was a Party to the conflict), the organization does not 
meet the next requirement either. Technically, Hezbollah meets the 
requirements of the fifth and sixth elements because Hezbollah was not a 
member of the Lebanese armed forces, and was not sent by a State which 
was not a Party to the conflict on any sort of official duty. 
If Hezbollah were to attain the classification of "mercenaries," only 
Common Article Three would apply in any future armed conflict. 
However, since Hezbollah does not meet all of the elements set forth by 
the definition, the type of international humanitarian law that would 
apply depends on whether this is an international or non-international 
armed conflict. As always, regardless of what classification Hezbollah 
falls under, international customary law applies. 
v. CONCLUSION 
By examining the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, the history of the region, 
and both the social and political developments of Hezbollah, a clearer 
legal picture can be formed with respect to the type of international 
humanitarian law that will apply in a future conflict between the two 
States. Due to Hezbollah's robust status in Lebanese economic, social, 
cultural, and political life, it is quite likely that a future armed conflict 
will be international in nature. If Hezbollah will again act either 
implicitly or explicitly on Lebanon's behalf, all of the Geneva 
Conventions will govern the conflict. Furthermore, Additional Protocols 
I and II will bind Lebanon because they are a signing party to this 
international treaty. Israel, as a non-signatory, will be bound by those 
principles in both Additional Protocol I and II that rise to the level of 
customary law. 
As international humanitarian law develops with each new armed 
conflict, it is also important to remember that Hezbollah militia may still 
be defined as "combatants" in a future armed conflict. In such a 
scenario, Additional Protocol I may provide prisoner of war protection to 
members of Hezbollah, provided that certain codified requirements are 
met by the group. Specifically, Hezbollah would have to distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population and carry arms in plain view 
during those times they are preparing for or engaging in military combat. 
In this type of conflict, Common Article 3 and customary law will also 
bind Hezbollah. Additionally, if Hezbollah limits its activity within 
mainstream Lebanese society and politics, it would be classified as 
terrorists, and be held accountable under Israeli domestic law. 
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From a humanitarian perspective, the hope is that Hezbollah, Lebanon, 
and Israel will not find themselves in a future armed conflict. However, 
not only does history usually repeat itself, but the Middle East is also a 
steaming pot of conflict that will likely keep boiling over. With this in 
mind, how Hezbollah is classified in future conflicts will have a 
tremendous impact on what laws will govern Hezbollah's conduct. If it 
is held to answer and is accountable under all of the Geneva 
Conventions, Additional Protocol I, and international customary law, the 
chances that the group will act more responsibly will only increase. 
Perhaps, Hezbollah will continue to grow and focus its attention on the 
complete annihilation of Israel. Possibly, Israel will also continue to 
violate various international humanitarian laws. However, the continued 
hope is that the core laws applicable to armed conflicts will help restore 
some peace in this part of the world. 
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